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Discounting and Divergence of Opinion
Elyès Jouiniy Jean-Michel Marinz Clotilde Nappx{
September 16, 2008
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to adopt a general equilibrium model and determine the
socially e¢ cient discount rate when there are heterogeneous anticipations about the future
of the economy as well as heterogeneous time preference rates. Among others we tackle
the following questions. Is the socially e¢ cient discount factor an arithmetic average of the
individual subjectively anticipated discount factors as in the certainty equivalent approach
of Weitzman (1998, 2001) ? As a sort of additional risk or uncertainty, can beliefs dispersion
lead to lower discount rates ? Is it socially e¢ cient, when diversity of opinion is taken
into account, to reduce the discount rate per year for more distant horizons ? Does the
socially e¢ cient discount rate converge in the long run to the lowest individual subjectively
anticipated discount rate as in the homogeneous beliefs setting ? More generally, what is
the shape of the yield curve ?
1. Introduction
The concept of a discount rate is central to economic analysis, as it allows e¤ects occurring at
di¤erent future times to be compared by converting each future dollar amount into equivalent
present dollars. The problem of the determination of a discount rate has acquired renewed
relevance lately in order to analyse environmental projects or activities1 the e¤ects of which will
be spread out over hundreds of years, and the evaluation of which, through Costs and Benets
Analysis (CBA), is very sensitive to the discount rate being used. For instance, concerning
global climate change, it has been argued that the strong conclusions of the Stern Review were
essentially driven by the low assumed discount rate (see, e.g. Nordhaus, 2007 or Weitzman,
2007).
As underlined by e.g. Nordhaus (2007) or Weitzman (2007), there is an important distinction
between the utility social discount rate and the consumption social discount rate. The former
refers to a pure time preference rate that discounts utility. It reects the level of impatience
The nancial support of the GIP ANR and of the Risk Foundation (Groupama Chair) are gratefully acknowl-
edged by the authors. We have beneted from comments from participants at the 6th Toulouse Conference on
Environment and Resources Economics and at the FIME (EDF-Dauphine) seminar.
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1Prominent examples include: global climate change, radioactive waste disposal, loss of biodiversity, thinning
of stratospheric ozone, groundwater pollution, minerals depletion, and many others.
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or, for long time horizon projects, the relative weights of di¤erent people or generations. The
latter is the rate used to discount future consumption. There are essentially three determinants
of the level of this discount rate. The rst determinant is related to a psychological preference
for the present e¤ect and is represented by the utility discount rate. The more impatient
the individuals, the higher the value of one unit of consumption today relative to one unit of
consumption tomorrow, the higher the discount rate. But there are other reasons to discount
future consumption. The second determinant is related to a wealth e¤ect while the third
determinant is related to a precautionary savings e¤ect. These two e¤ects are directly impacted
by agents beliefs about the future of the economy. In this paper we are interested in the
properties of the consumption social discount rate since our aim is to determine the value today
(in present dollars) of future dollars amount in order to apply it for CBA.
A critical feature that must be taken into account is divergence of opinion about the future
of the economy. Forecasting for the coming year is already a di¢ cult task. It is natural that
forecasts for the next century/millennium are subject to potentially enormous divergence. It
is doubtful that agents or economists currently have a complete understanding of the determi-
nants of long term economic evolutions. The debate on the notion of sustainable growth is an
illustration of the degree of possible divergence of opinion about future of society. Some will
argue that the e¤ects of improvement in information technology have yet to be realized and the
world faces a period of more rapid growth. On the contrary, those who emphasise the e¤ects
of natural resource scarcity will see lower growth rates in the future. Some even suggest a neg-
ative growth of the GNP per head in the future, due to the deterioration of the environment,
population growth and decreasing return to scales.
Another critical feature that must be taken into account is the heterogeneity of utility dis-
count rates among agents. These rates may reect di¤erent levels of impatience. In a setting
with long-lived agents that represent present and future generations, these rates may also reect
divergence of opinion about the importance granted to the welfare of future generations relative
to the present. The important debate among economists (and also among philosophers) on the
notion of intergenerational equity is an illustration of this possible divergence. Some will argue
that intergenerational choices should be treated as intertemporal individual choices leading to
weigh more present welfare. Others will argue that fundamental ethics require intergenerational
neutrality and that the only ethical basis for placing less value on the welfare of future gener-
ations is the uncertainty about whether or not the world will exist and whether or not these
generations will be present.
In this paper we explicitly take into account possible disagreement among agents about
the future of the economy and about the treatment of future generations. As underlined by
Weitzman (2001), these and many more are fundamentally matters of judgment or opinion,
on which fully informed and fully rational individuals might be expected to di¤er. In such
a framework, our aim is to determine the socially e¢ cient discount rate and to analyse its
properties; in particular, we want to determine the analog of Ramsey Equation2 in a fairly
2 In a deterministic setting, the well-known Ramsey equation gives the following expression for the discount
rate
R = +
1

g;
2
general heterogeneous, time-varying and stochastic3 setting. Among others, we wish to tackle
the following questions. Is there general equilibrium foundation for synthesizing opinions by
taking an average as in the certainty equivalent approach of Weitzman (1998, 2001) ? How do
discount rates vary with the degree of beliefs and tastes divergence ? Is it socially e¢ cient, when
there is beliefs heterogeneity, to reduce the discount rate per year for more distant horizons ?
More generally, what is the shape of the yield curve ?
The last questions about the shape of the yield curve are of particular interest. There is a
wide agreement that discounting at a constant positive rate for long time horizons is problem-
atic, irrespective of the particular discount rate employed. Indeed, with a constant rate, the
costs and benets accruing in the distant future appear relatively unimportant in present value
terms. Hence decisions made today on this basis may expose us to catastrophic consequences
in a distant future. Weitzman (1998) summarises this succinctly when he states : « To think
about the distant future in terms of standard discounting is to have an uneasy intuitive feeling
that something is wrong somewhere » . A recently proposed solution to this problem is to use
a discount rate which declines over time. It is clear that using a declining discount rate could
make an important contribution towards the goal of sustainable development. But what formal
justications exist for using a declining discount rate and what is the optimal trajectory of the
decline4 ? In a deterministic world, decreasing discount rates can arise as a result of known
changes in the growth rate, changes in risk aversion, etc. Additional motivations emerge once
uncertainty is considered. For example, Weitzman (1998, 2001) considers uncertainty on the
discount rate itself. Starting from the fact that there is a huge divergence of expectations about
future discount rates among economic experts, Weitzman (1998, 2001)5 introduces a probabil-
ity distribution for the future discount rate and its behaviour over time. The author adopts a
certainty equivalent analysis in order to determine the discount rates for varying horizons and
obtains decreasing discount rates. More generally, Gollier (2002a), Dybvig et al.(1996), Weitz-
man (1998, 2001) show in di¤erent contexts that from todays perspective, the only relevant
limiting scenario is the one with the lowest interest rate. In the presence of uncertain growth,
Gollier (2002a, 2002b) shows that the shape of the yield curve depends upon preferences for
risk and prudence, and higher order moments of the utility function. Regardless of whether it is
the discount rate or the growth rate that is uncertain, the nature of the distribution of random
growth is of particular importance; for instance, decreasing discount rates are obtained with
Bayesian learning in Weitzman (2004), and Gollier (2007) shows that serial correlation in the
growth rates leads to downward sloping yield curves when the representative agent is prudent.
Decreasing discount rates also emerge from the specication of a sustainable welfare function
à la Chichilnisky (1996) and Li and Löfgren (2000). Lastly, there is considerable empirical
and experimental evidence to show that individuals are frequently hyperbolic discounters (see,
where  denotes the rate of pure time preference, g is the per capita growth rate of consumption and 1= is the
elasticity of marginal utility, or equivalently the degree of relative risk aversion.
3As in standard models of the term structure of interest rates (see, e.g., Cox et al., 1985, Ingersoll and Ross,
1992, Vasicek, 1977, Cochrane, 2001).
4See Groom et al. (2005) for a survey.
5Weitzman (2001) undertakes a survey of over 2 000 academic economists, and a so-called blue ribbon selection
of 50, as to their opinion on the constant rate of discount to use for Cost Benet Analysis. The responses were
distributed with a gamma distribution with mean 4% and standard deviation of 3%.
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e.g. Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989, Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). In this paper, we want to
examine if divergence of beliefs and heterogeneity of time preference rates can be a justication
for the use of declining discount rates in a general equilibrium framework. More generally, we
want to analyse if the equilibrium yield curve with beliefs and tastes heterogeneity has desirable
properties.
Our theoretical framework builds upon Jouini and Napp (2007) and generalizes it to take into
account heterogeneous time preference rates and innite horizon. The agents hold heterogeneous
expectations about the future of the economy. Our model encompasses disagreement about the
future growth rate or about its distribution and dynamics (since we allow for stochastic growth
rates) or, for example, disagreement about the possible impact of economic activity on the
climate6, or disagreement about the estimation of the possible economic damages that would
be induced by climate change. In our model, the agents also di¤er in their rate of pure time
preference. This may reect di¤erent levels of impatience as well as di¤erent conceptions of
intergenerational equity or disagreement about the probability that the world will exist at a
given future date (see the Stern Report for the link between this probability and the pure
time preference rate). Note that while the aim of Jouini and Napp (2007) was to provide an
aggregation procedure, the aim of this paper is to analyse the properties of equilibrium discount
rates. As in Gollier (2002a, 2002b), Weitzman (1998, 2001, 2007) and Nordhaus (2007), we focus
on an exchange economy in order to analyse the tradeo¤ between current and future wealth,
in particular for CBA. Nevertheless, our model can also shed some light on the analysis of
the tradeo¤ between current production and the environmental and economic welfare of future
generations; indeed, our results permit to characterise the marginal cost we are willing to invest
in any technology that can reduce climate change impact in the future.
We provide the following answers to the questions above. We rst obtain that the certainty
equivalent approach of Weitzman (1998, 2001) and Reinschmidt (2002), that consists in taking
the arithmetic average7 of the individually recommended discount factors is compatible with
an equilibrium approach if we assume that all utility functions are logarithmic and that all
the agents have the same endowment and the same time preference rate8. More generally,
for logarithmic utility functions, the socially e¢ cient discount factor is given by a weighted
average of the individually recommended discount factors, the weights being determined by
the individual time preference rates and the initial endowments. For more general CRRA
utility functions with relative risk aversion level 1=, the right concept of average to consider
within an equilibrium approach is not the arithmetic average but an  average. This average
is, as in the logarithmic case, a weighted average. Finally, there is a bias induced by agents
heterogeneity. Except in very specic settings, it is not possible to recover the socially e¢ cient
discount factor as an average of the individual subjectively anticipated9 discount factors. These
6One agent may assume that economic activity will lead to a 1C excess temperature in 50 years with a 95%
condence interval of 0.5C, while another agent may assume that economic activity will lead to a 3C excess
temperature with a 95% condence interval of 1.5C.
7See also Nocetti et al. (2008) for an approach leading to (possibly weighted) arithmetic averages.
8More precisely, it su¢ ces that the product of the endowment and of the time preference rate be the same for
all the agents.
9For a given agent i; the individual subjectively anticipated prices, discount rates and discount factors are
those that would prevail if the economy was made of agent i only.
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specic settings are rst, the already mentioned logarithmic utility setting, and second, the
setting with deterministic heterogeneity in pure time preference rates and no beliefs dispersion
(which includes the setting with rational agents and deterministic time preference rates of Gollier
and Zeckhauser, 2005, or Lengwiller, 2005). In a general setting, there is an aggregation bias
and we show that it can be quite signicant. The bias can be towards higher or lower discount
rates depending on the relative position of  with respect to 1. This result is consistent with
the interpretation of beliefs and time preference heterogeneity as an additional source of risk or
uncertainty in the future, leading agents to value more or less future consumption (with respect
to present consumption) depending on the relative level of prudence and risk aversion.
We examine the impact of beliefs and time preference heterogeneity on the expression of the
discount rate as well as on the relationship between the discount rate and the time horizon (the
possible shapes of the yield curve). Increased beliefs dispersion leads to a decrease of discount
rates when  is greater than one. We show that aggregate pessimism as well as aggregate
patience reduce the socially e¢ cient discount rate. Since these aggregate levels are given by
stochastic, time-varying (risk-tolerance) weighted averages of the individual levels of pessimism
and patience, possible correlation e¤ects are induced. This leads in the medium term to a rich
class of possible shapes for the yield curve. In particular, our model can t observed behavior
of the yield curve in nancial markets where the "long term rate" (30 years) is usually higher
than the short term rate. More precisely, our model is compatible with yield curves that are
increasing in the short term and in the medium term (that corresponds to the nancial markets
long term) and that are decreasing in the long term.
We show that the yield curve is always decreasing in the (very) long run. Indeed, the bias
due to beliefs dispersion vanishes in the long run and the asymptotic discount rate is given by
the lowest individually anticipated asymptotic discount rate among all agents 10. Note that this
lowest individually anticipated asymptotic discount rate does not necessarily correspond to the
rate of the most patient agent as in the homogeneous beliefs setting. For example, in the case of
homogeneous time preference rates, the asymptotic discount rate is given by the discount rate
of the most pessimistic agent which would consist to focus on the worst case scenario among the
agents (if each agent is associated to some scenarios). More generally, both the distributions
of time preference rates and of pessimism are necessary to determine the asymptotic discount
rate. In the setting of a CBA, this leads to discount long term costs and benets at the lowest
anticipated rate inducing a bias towards the optimal policy of the agent who values the most
future consumption in the long term. In fact, the agent who values the most future consumption
(either because she is very pessimistic about the future or because she is very patient or any
combination of these two possibilities) makes the market for long term bonds and therefore
imposes her price. This provides us with a guideline for long term CBA. This is especially
useful since, while the observed risk free rate provides a useful tool for CBA in the short term,
nancial markets are not very helpful when benets and costs of the set of current potential
actions are expected to last in the medium and/or in the long run11.
10Note that we retrieve at the consumption discount rate level results that are already known at the utility
discount rate level. This transfer of properties from utility to consumption discount rates is immediate when
agents share the same beliefs.
11For example, greenhouse gas that one emits today yields very long term costs like global warming. Liquid
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3
deals with socially e¢ cient discount factors and discount rates and in particular, analyses their
link with their individual subjectively anticipated counterparts. Section 4 is devoted to long
term considerations. In Section 5, we analyse more in detail the shape of the yield curve in
specic settings. The conclusion summarises the main contributions of the paper. Proofs of
aggregation results and other extensions of Jouini-Napp (2007) are in Appendix A. Appendix
B consists of the proofs of all other results.
2. The theoretical framework
We consider a continuous-time Arrow-Debreu economy with an innite horizon, in which risk
averse agents try to maximize the expected utility of future consumption. A ltered probability
space (
; F; (Ft) ; P ) is given. Each agent indexed by i = 1; :::N; has a current endowment at
time t denoted by eit and a Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function for future consumption
of the form EQ
i
hR1
0 exp
  R t0 i(s;!)ds u (ct (!)) dti ; which means that agents may di¤er in their
subjective beliefs (represented by the probability measure Qi); in their pure time preference
rate process i; and in their endowment process ei : The utility function u can represent the
individuals utility function but may also incorporate the preferences of his descendants.
As in Jouini-Napp (2007), agents have di¤erent expectations about the future of the econ-
omy. In a purely nancial framework, such beliefs heterogeneity might result, for instance, from
di¤erent subjective probabilities of occurrence of a boom or of a krach. In a macroeconomic
setting, beliefs heterogeneity might result from heterogeneous growth rate forecasts. More gen-
erally, beliefs heterogeneity might also result from di¤erences of opinion about the likelihood
of a catastrophe, about the probability distribution of the impact of human activity on the cli-
mate or on the possible damages resulting from climate change. In our model, agents may also
disagree about the pure time preference rate. This may reect di¤erent levels of preference for
the present. With long-lived agents that represent present and future generations, this reects
di¤erent conceptions of intergenerational equity.
For tractability reasons and in order to focus on the impact of beliefs and time preference
rate heterogeneity, we restrict our analysis to homogeneous utility functions of the power type,
i.e. we suppose that agents share the same CRRA utility function12 for consumption, of the form
u0 (x) = x 1=: As far as beliefs heterogeneity is concerned, the unique assumption we essentially
make is the equivalence of the probability measures Qi. In other words, we assume that the
agents have the same set of possible events (i.e. events with a positive subjective probability13).
Letting
 
M i

denote the positive density process of Qi with respect to P and letting Dit 
exp 
R t
0 
i(s;!)ds denote the individual pure time preference discount factor at time t; the utility
function of agent i can equivalently be written in the form E
R1
0 M
i
t (!)D
i
t (!)u (ct (!)) dt

:
We let e  PNi=1 ei denote the aggregate endowment process. We make the assumption
nancial instruments with such large durations do not exist. For the sake of comparison, US treasury bonds have
time horizons that do not exceed 30 years.
12Our approach can be extended to the case with HARA utility functions of the form u0(x) = ( + x) 
1
 .
13Note that this is a natural assumption for the existence of an equilibrium. Otherwise some agents will consider
as possible some events that are considered as impossible by others and optimal demand in the associated Arrow-
Debreu asset will be (positively or negatively) innite.
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that e and M i satisfy the following stochastic di¤erential equations(
det = tetdt+ tetdWt e0 = 1
dM it = 
i
tM
i
tdWt
where W denotes a standard unidimensional ((Ft) ; P ) Brownian motion and where t; t and
it stand respectively for (t; !); (t; !) and 
i(t; !); which means that they might depend upon
time and states of the world. There is no Markovian assumption; the coe¢ cients ;  and i for
i = 1; :::; N may depend on the entire past history of the economy14.
Let us recall the following notation. For a given process (t) ; the Doléans-Dade exponential
Et () denotes the quantity exp(
R t
0 sdWs   12
R t
0 
2
sds): With this notation we have, for all i;
M it = Et
 
i

:
According to Girsanov Theorem, for agent i, aggregate endowment is an Itô process with
di¤usion parameter (t; !) and with subjective drift parameter i(t; !)  (t; !)+(t; !)i(t; !);
which means that in our model, agents di¤er in their expected instantaneous growth rate of
aggregate endowment and agree about its volatility15. Note that even if the agents agree on
the instantaneous level of risk (t; !), the fact that i(t; :) is stochastic permits disagreement
among agents about the level of risk. For instance, agents for which the stochastic process i
exhibits positive (resp. negative) serial dependence will weigh more (resp. less) extreme events
(see Gollier, 2007). Even in the extreme case where there is no time dependence, where  is
constant and where i is a discrete random variable (independent of t and of W ), the variance
of the logarithmic return between date 0 and date T is equal to 2T + V ar
 
i

T 2 allowing for
divergence of opinion among agents about the level of risk.
Note that the process i as well as i are (Ft) adapted stochastic processes, which may be
updated continuously according to the available information. In particular, the individual beliefs
i we consider might result from Bayesian updating as in e.g. Detemple and Murthy (1994)
and Zapatero (1998) or from adaptative learning as in Brock and Durlauf (2001). For instance,
if the states of the world are associated to di¤erent possible levels of climate change (di¤erent
levels of excess temperature), E
hR T
t 
i(s; !)ds
Fti will represent the average logarithmic return
between dates t and T that is anticipated by agent i at date t based on date t scientic knowledge
about climate change and its possible impact on the economic growth.
In our general framework, an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is dened, as usual, by a positive
price process q and a family of optimal consumption plans

yi

i=1;:::;N
such that markets
clear, i.e. (
yi = yi

q;M i; Di; ei

PN
i=1 y
i = e
where yi (q;M;D; e) = argmaxE[
R1
0 qt(y
i
t et)dt]0E
R1
0 MtDtu (ct) dt

:
14We only assume that for all T;
R T
0
jtj dt <1;
R T
0
2t  dt <1; and R T0  it2 dt <1, almost surely:
15More precisely, letting W it  Wt  
R t
0
ids, we obtain through Girsanov Theorem that W i is a Brownian
motion under Qi and det =
 
t + t
i

et dt+ te

t dW
i
t :
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3. Discount factors and discount rates
As in Jouini-Napp (2007), we start from an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium

q;

yi

i=1;:::;N

: Note
that since our utility functions satisfy Inada conditions, all equilibria are interior, hence there
exist positive Lagrange multipliers (i)i=1;:::;N such that for all i, the equality M
i
tD
i
tu
0

yit

=
iq

t holds for all t: We let i  (1=i)
PN
j=1(1=j)
 :
We x a date t > 0; at which a cost or benet is incurred. The socially e¢ cient discount
factor At between date 0 and date t is the price of a zero coupon bond maturing at time t and
is given by At  E [qt ] : The (average) socially e¢ cient discount rate Rt is dened as Rt 
 1t logAt: Analogously, the discount factor At;i and the discount rate Rt;i that would prevail if
the economy was made of agent i only are given by Rt;i   1t logAt;i   1t logE

M itD
i
tu
0 (et )

:
These are the discount factor and discount rate that agent i anticipates.
The aim of this section is twofold. First, to analyse the link between the socially e¢ cient
discount rate Rt and the individual subjectively anticipated discount rates Rt;i: Second, to
analyse the expression of the socially e¢ cient discount rate Rt and, in particular, how it departs
from the standard setting.
We rst consider to what extent individual subjectively anticipated socially e¢ cient discount
factors can be averaged into a consensus discount factor. Our question can be rephrased as
follows: can the socially e¢ cient discount factor At be represented as an average of the individual
At;i ?
Proposition 3.1. 1. If there is no beliefs heterogeneity and if time-preference rates are
deterministic, i.e., if i(s; !)  (s; !) and i (s; !)  i (s) ; then the socially e¢ cient
discount factor is an  average of the individual subjectively anticipated socially e¢ cient
discount factors, more precisely
At =
"
NX
i=1
i
 
At;i
#1=
:
2. In the general setting,
 If  = 1; then At =PNi=1 i  At;i :
 Otherwise, we have
At 
"
NX
i=1
i
 
At;i
#1=
for  < 1
and
At 
"
NX
i=1
i
 
At;i
#1=
for  > 1;
with equality holding only when the divergence in individual characteristics N i 
M iDi is deterministic, i.e. if N i=N j is deterministic for all (i; j).
Proposition 3.1 means rst that the right concept of average to consider for discount factors
(in the case of power utility functions) is an  average, which is an arithmetic average only in the
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case of logarithmic utility functions. Moreover, this  average is a weighted average, the weights
being given by the parameters i. These weights are deterministic and they will be analysed
more in detail in Section 5. Finally, except in very specic settings, it is not possible to recover
the socially e¢ cient discount factor as an average of the individual subjectively anticipated
discount factors. These specic settings are rst, the setting with deterministic heterogeneity in
pure time preference rates and no beliefs dispersion16 (which includes the setting with rational
agents and deterministic time preference rates of Gollier and Zeckhauser, 2005), and second,
the setting with logarithmic utility functions. In a general setting, there is an aggregation bias.
The price at date 0 of a zero-coupon bond maturing at date t is lower (resp. higher) than the
(weighted  ) average of the subjectively anticipated prices for  < 1 (resp.  > 1): This means
that with beliefs dispersion and/or stochastic time preference heterogeneity, individuals value
less (resp. more) one unit of consumption at date t when  < 1 (resp.  > 1):
As far as the magnitude of these biases are concerned, we shall see in Section 5 that the
di¤erence between the socially e¢ cient discount rate and the rate associated to the  average
of the individual subjectively anticipated discount rates can be signicant.
Let us elaborate on why these biases (with respect to the  average) are in opposite direc-
tions depending on the position of  with respect to 1: The interpretation of  as a degree of
relative risk tolerance is not enlightening for our purpose. It seems more meaningful to observe
that the condition   1 is equivalent, in our setting, to the condition that prudence is larger
than twice absolute risk aversion. Indeed, this last condition17 appears as crucial in intertem-
poral choices analysis; Gollier and Kimball (1996) show that, in a standard portfolio problem,
the opportunity to invest in a risky asset raises (resp. reduces) the aggregate saving if and
only if absolute prudence is larger (resp. smaller) than twice absolute risk aversion: Moreover,
Gollier (2000) studies the problem of the optimal use of a good whose consumption can produce
damages in the future and shows that scientic progress providing information on the distribu-
tion of the intensity of damages induces earlier prevention e¤ort only if prudence is larger than
twice risk aversion. Hence, a possible interpretation of the central role of  = 1 is the following.
Interpret beliefs heterogeneity and time preference heterogeneity in a stochastic setting as ad-
ditional risk or as less information or more uncertainty about the future. According to Gollier
and Kimball (1996) or Gollier (2000), this should lead agents to value more future consumption
in the case  > 1 and less future consumption in the case  < 1, which is essentially the result
of Proposition 3:1:
Notice that Proposition 3:1 implies that the approach that consists in considering an arith-
metic average of the individual subjectively anticipated discount rates is compatible with a
general equilibrium approach as far as agents are endowed with logarithmic utility functions.
We now analyse more precisely the expression of the socially e¢ cient discount rate and, in
particular, we compare it with the standard setting. For this purpose, let us rst recall some
results about the risk free rate. In the standard setting with rational beliefs and homogeneous
16Note that no beliefs dispersion does not mean that individuals are rational; they can all share the same
subjective belief. Analogously, all time preference rates i need not be deterministic but they need to be written
in the form i(t; !) = (t; !)ai(t) where  is a common term and where ai is a deterministic process.
17This condition has been thoroughly studied by Gollier (2000) and has appeared in di¤erent contexts (Drèze
and Modigliani, 1972, Caroll and Kimball, 1996, Sinclair-Desgagné and Gabel, 1997, Dionne and Fombaron,
1996).
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time preference rate , the risk free rate is given by
rf (stdd) = +


  1
2
1


1 +
1


2 (3.1)
where all parameters ; ;  hence rf may depend upon t and !: This is an extension of Ramsey
Equation to a stochastic setting, which illustrates the patience e¤ect, the wealth e¤ect as well
as the precautionary savings e¤ect on the risk free rate. In our setting with heterogeneous time
preference rates and beliefs, we obtain (see Proposition A-2 in Appendix A) that the risk free
rate is given by
rf = D +
+ M

  1
2
1


1 +
1


2 + B (3.2)
with D 
PN
i=1  i
i; M 
PN
i=1  i
i, and B  12 (1  )V ar () where  i = y
i
e represents
agent i risk tolerance and where V ar () represents the variance of the is across the agents
when agent i is endowed with a weight  i: In other words, the homogeneous time preference rate
 of the Ramsey formula is replaced by the average time preference rate D and the objective
growth rate  is replaced by the average subjective growth rate + M. Furthermore, there is
an additional term B that is directly related to beliefsdispersion and whose impact is towards
an increase or a decrease of the risk free rate depending on the position of  with respect
to 1. This is a straightforward generalization of Jouini-Napp (2007) that takes into account
heterogeneous time preference rates. Note that the precautionary savings term is the same
in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) since, as previously underlined, in our model all agents necessarily
agree on the volatility level  (as a consequence of the equivalence of the subjective probability
measures Qi): Notice also that even when all parameters i, i;  and  are constants, the risk
tolerance weighted averages D and M as well as the variance term B are time-varying and
stochastic, hence the risk free rate is also time-varying and stochastic (which is not the case in
the standard setting).
Comparing Equations (3.1) and (3.2), it is easy to see that there are essentially three possible
ways through which beliefs and time preference rates heterogeneity may lead to lower risk
free rates; rst, a negative correlation between impatience and risk tolerance or a low level of
impatience, second, a positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance or a high level
of pessimism, third, a negative beliefs dispersion e¤ect that corresponds to the case  > 1.
The following proposition enables us to show that analogous results are obtained for the
socially e¢ cient discount rate. We adopt the same notations as in Equation (3:2) :
Proposition 3.2. The socially e¢ cient discount rate Rt is given by
Rt =  1
t
logE

DtMtBtu
0(et )

(3.3)
=  1
t
logEQt

exp 
Z t
0
rfs ds

(3.4)
with Bt = exp

  R t0 B(s)ds ; Dt = exp  R t0 D(s)ds,Mt = Et (M ) and dQtdP = Et M   
Notice rst through Equation (3.4) that when rf is deterministic (or when rf and dQtdP are
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independent), all that we have just said about the impact of beliefs and time preference rates
heterogeneity on rf is true of Rt: In particular, aggregate patience, aggregate pessimism, as well
as increased beliefs dispersion when  > 1 induce a socially e¢ cient discount rate that is lower
than in the standard setting.
More generally, the comparison of Equation (3.3) with the expression of the socially e¢ cient
discount rate in the standard setting, which is given by Rt (stdd) =  1t logE [exp ( t)u0(et )],
permits to exhibit three determinants of the impact of beliefs and time preference rates hetero-
geneity on the discount rate: rst, the consensus time preference factor D; second, the belief
(density) M; and third, the aggregation bias B. The analysis of the e¤ect of these three factors
on the discount rate (between date 0 and t) is less straightforward than for the (instantaneaous)
risk free rate at a given date t. However, the main conclusions remain valid. Indeed, excess
patience at the aggregate level, in the form of an average time preference rate
R t
0 D(s)ds that
is lower than the standard time preference rate
R t
0 (s)ds leads to a higher D hence, ceteris
paribus, to a lower discount rate Rt: Beliefs dispersion for   1 leads to a nonpositive parame-
ter B and to a factor B that is greater than 1, hence, ceteris paribus, to a discount rate that
is lower than in the standard setting. Analogously, increased beliefs dispersion in the form of
a higher V ar () leads to an increase in B for   1 hence, ceteris paribus, to a decrease in
the discount rate. As far as aggregate pessimism is concerned, intuitively, a pessimistic belief
increases the expected value of a decreasing function of the total endowment e; hence should
lead to a lower discount rate R: The case with deterministic parameters t and t illustrates
this intuition. Indeed, it is then easy to obtain (see Appendix A, Proposition A-3) that, if the
consensus belief is neutral or pessimistic, i.e., when M  0; then
 1
t
logE

Mtu
0 (et )
   1
t
logE

u0 (et )

;
hence the e¤ect of pessimism only is toward a lower discount rate. In fact, we obtain that the
impact of beliefs heterogeneity is towards a lower (resp. higher) socially e¢ cient discount rate
if the consensus belief is neutral or pessimistic (M  0 ) and when   1 (resp. the consensus
belief is neutral or optimistic, i.e. M  0, and when   1). This result is in the spirit of the
ndings of Dumas et al. (2008) that obtains, in a specic sentiment framework, that whenever
risk aversion is [an integer] greater than 1, an increase in the variance of sentiment reduces the
expected values of all the future stochastic discount factors.
4. Long term considerations
We now turn to (very) long term considerations. In particular, is it socially e¢ cient, when
diversity of opinion is taken into account, to reduce the discount rate per year for far distant
horizons ? We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4.1. We suppose that for all i, the individual asymptotic discount rate R1;i 
lim
t!1R
t;i exists18. The asymptotic socially e¢ cient discount rate exists and is given by the lowest
18These limits can be replaced by limits along sequences, i.e. R1;i = limn!1Rtn;i for some sequence tn such
that lim tn = 1: In this case, the asymptotic socially e¢ cient discount rate would be dened along the same
sequences.
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subjectively anticipated discount rate i.e.
R1  lim
t!1R
t = inf

R1;i; i = 1; :::; N
	
:
Let us remark that in a model where each individual corresponds to an expert who consults
a subjective model in order to recommend discount rates, the existence of R1;i for all i; means
that each expert is able to propose an asymptotic discount rate.
Proposition 4.1 shows rst that the bias, due to beliefs heterogeneity, that we have exhib-
ited in the previous section vanishes in the long run. The socially e¢ cient discount rate behaves
asymptotically as the discount rate associated to an average of the individual subjectively an-
ticipated discount factors. Indeed, under the conditions of the proposition, the socially e¢ cient
discount rate Rt converges to the lowest individual subjectively anticipated discount rate as
does the rate associated to any of the considered averages of the anticipated discount factors:
The fact that the dispersion term vanishes in the long term may seem counterintuitive accord-
ing to Equations (3.2) and (3.3). Indeed, the bias between R and an average of the Ris is
represented (up to a constant) by the variance of the is and it is not clear whether or not this
variance term is negligible in the long run. In particular, the unweighted variance of the is is
exogeneously given in our model and does not necessarily converge to zero. The fact that the
weighted variance vanishes is then directly related to the dynamics of the stochastic weights
 i. Furthermore, we emphasise that the bias vanishes only asymptotically, and we shall see
in the next section that we may have to consider very far horizons (hundreds of years) before
observing this asymptotic behavior.
Proposition 4.1 proves foremost that, from todays perspective, among the possible subjec-
tively anticipated asymptotic behaviors R1;i; the only relevant asymptotic behavior is the one
with the lowest discount rate. In other words, in a setting with heterogeneous agents, only the
agent with the lowest anticipated discount rate matters in the long run. In fact, the agent who
values the most future consumption (either because she is very pessimistic about the future or
because she is very patient or any combination of these two possibilities) makes the market for
long term bonds and therefore imposes her price. Mathematically, from todays perspectives,
all the other agents become negligible in the long run, because their weighthas been reduced
by the power of compound discounting at a higher expected discount rate. Asymptotically, the
value of the socially e¢ cient discount factor is then given by the discount factor that would
prevail in an economy made of the agent with the lowest rate only. In the case of homogeneous
beliefs and heterogeneous time preference rates, this implies that the asymptotic discount rate
is given by the rate associated with the lowest rate of impatience. In particular, the result of
Gollier-Zeckhauser (2005) on the asymptotic discount rate with heterogeneous time preference
rates19 remains valid in a stochastic setting. In the case with homogeneous time preference rates
and heterogeneous beliefs, Proposition 4.1 implies that the asymptotic socially e¢ cient discount
rate is given by the rate of the most pessimistic agent. More generally, both the distributions
of time preference rates and of pessimism are necessary to determine the asymptotic discount
rate (which is the lowest anticipated discount rate).
19See also Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Li and Löfgren (2000).
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In the setting of a CBA, this leads to discount long term costs and benets at the lowest
anticipated rate inducing a bias towards the optimal policy of the agent who values the most
future consumption in the long term. How does Proposition 4.1 relate to the previous results
of, e.g., Dybvig et al.(1996), Gollier (2002b), Weitzman (1998, 2001), who show - in a standard
stochastic setting with a representative agent with rational beliefs and a given time preference
rate parameter - that the long term discount rate is associated with the scenario with the lowest
possible rate (worst case scenario). Proposition 4.1 brings about an additional element in favor
of the choice of low discount rates in the long run. Indeed, the result about the worst scenario
implies that for each agent denoted by i; the asymptotic rate R1;i corresponds to his worst
scenario (over possible states of the world). Proposition 4.1 implies then that the asymptotic
behavior of the socially e¢ cient discount rate is given by the lowest (among agents) of the lowest
possible rate (among possible scenarios or states of the world). As an illustration, consider the
simple case in which the instantaneous rate of growth of aggregate endowment denoted by  is
a discrete random variable, independent of t and of W; taking values 1; :::; J with probability
p1; :::; pJ and suppose that ; i; i are constants. We easily get that for all i = 1; :::N;
the asymptotic subjectively anticipated discount rate is given by the rate associated to the
worst possible scenario, i.e., R1;i = i + 1
 
infj=1;:::;J j + 
i
  12 1 1 + 12: According to
Proposition 4.1, the socially e¢ cient discount rate is then given by the lowest possible rate
among the agents, i.e. R1 = infi=1;:::;N
 
i + i

+
infj=1;:::;J j
   12 1

1 + 1

2:
In order to determine the whole shape of the yield curve, we must determine explicit formulas
for the socially e¢ cient discount rates. As seen in Proposition 3.2, we need to analyse how the
individual risk tolerances  i evolve over time, since they are key features in our analysis. Besides,
we have seen that the covariance between individual risk tolerances and individual beliefs and
taste parameters play an important part. This means that it is necessary to consider specic
settings in order to analyse the shape of the yield curve.
5. Specic settings and the shape of the yield curve
We consider the setting with constant parameters. In such a setting, we know that in the
standard model with rational beliefs and homogeneous time preference rates, the yield curve is
at and the socially e¢ cient discount rate is given for all t by Rt = +    12 1

1 + 1

2: The
aim of this section is to analyse the impact of beliefs and time preference rates heterogeneity
on the shape of the yield curve.
More precisely, we assume that the aggregate endowment process parameters  and  are
constant as well as the individual beliefs and time preference parameters i and i. We suppose
that for all i; the relative level of endowment of agent i satises ei = wie for some constant
wi: Moreover, we assume that, for all i;
i +

1

  1
 
+ i
  1
2
1


1

  1

2 > 0 (5.1)
which is a necessary condition for the individual optimization problems to be well dened. Note
that assuming constant is may seem incompatible with learning. However, we consider the
case with constant parameters as an approximation of the situation where all the parameters
13
are stochastic and where learning is regularly compensated by new shocks on the drift :
For all i, the individual subjectively anticipated discount rate Rt;i is time and state inde-
pendent and given by Ri = i + +
i
   12 1

1 + 1

2: We recall that even in this setting
the consensus characteristics M and D as well as the aggregation bias B are time-varying,
stochastic processes.
5.1. Logarithmic utility functions
As we have underlined it in Section 3, the case of logarithmic utility functions is very specic.
Indeed, in that case, the socially e¢ cient discount factor can be expressed as a weighted arith-
metic average of the individual subjectively anticipated ones, more precisely At =
P
i iA
t;i (see
Proposition 3.1) and there is no aggregation bias B in the expression of the socially e¢ cient
discount rate (see Equation 3.3).
Note that Condition (5:1) is equivalent in the logarithmic setting to the condition that all
time preference rates be positive. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.1. In the case of logarithmic utility agents with positive time preference rates
i, we have
1. The weight i of each individual subjectively anticipated discount factor in the socially
e¢ cient discount factor is given by i =
wi
iPN
j=1 wj
j
; i = 1; :::; N:
2. The socially e¢ cient discount rate satises
Rt =   2   1
t
log
"
NX
i=1
i exp 
 
i + i

t
#
for all t > 0;
R0 =   2 +
NX
i=1
i
 
i + i

; R1 =   2 + inf
i=1;:::N
 
i + i

:
The yield curve
 
Rt

t
is downward sloping:
We recall that in the standard setting with logarithmic utility functions, the yield curve is
at and for all endowment distribution, the rational discount rate Rt is given by Rt =  2 for
all t: When beliefs and time preference rates are heterogeneous, Proposition 5.1 shows that the
yield curve (i.e. the socially e¢ cient discount factor as a function of time) is always downward
sloping. The behavior of the socially e¢ cient discount factor as a function of beliefs dispersion is
more complex since it depends on the correlation between individual characteristics (wi; i; i).
In order to focus on the impact of beliefs dispersion, Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent the
yield curve in a 2 agents setting with no pessimism/optimism on average, i.e. 1 + 2 = 0:
Figure 1 represents the yield curve in the particular setting with w1 = w2 and 1 = 2.
In this case, the discount factor is an equally weighted arithmetic average of the individual
subjectively anticipated discount factors, as in Weitzman (1998, 2001). The short term rate is
the rational rate and the long term rate is the pessimistic rate. Moreover, for all t; the discount
rate Rt decreases with beliefs dispersion.
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Insert Figure 1
The setting with possibly di¤erent endowment levels (but still with 1 = 2) is illustrated
in Figure 2. The consensus discount factor is an endowment-weighted arithmetic average of the
individual subjective discount factors. The yield curve is still downward sloping. The short term
rate is an endowment weighted average of the individually anticipated short term rates, which
di¤ers from the rational rate if w1 6= w2. If there is a positive correlation between optimism
and initial endowment, then the short-term discount rate is higher than in the rational setting
and an increase in beliefs heterogeneity increases the short-term rate. The long term rate is
still given by the pessimistic rate and an increase in beliefs dispersion always decreases the long
term rate. More generally, an increase in beliefs dispersion lowers the yield curve when there
is a negative correlation between optimism and initial endowment and rotate it clockwise when
there is a positive correlation between optimism and initial endowment. Finally, an increase in
the initial relative wealth of the optimistic agent induces a higher short-term discount rate and
a greater spread between the short-term discount rate R0 and the long-term discount rate R1;
the spread being always positive.
Insert Figure 2
Table 1 sums up the possible results with two agents who are on average rational, i.e.
1 + 2 = 0: The results are similar with N agents that are on average rational.
If there is a (pessimistic or optimistic) bias on average, i.e. if 1N
PN
i=1 
i =  6= 0; then there
is an additional optimism (when  is positive) or pessimism (when  is negative) e¤ect on the
discount rate.
We can consider settings with a continuous distribution on the individual beliefs
 
i

as
a limit of a setting with a large number of agents: If we suppose that initial endowment is
equally distributed20; then we obtain as an easy extension of the discrete setting that the
discount factor is an average of the individual subjectively anticipated discount factors, i.e.
At = Ei

At;i

: Assuming a Gamma distribution on the individual subjectively anticipated
discount rates (resp. a normal distribution on individual beliefs), we retrieve the expression of
the discount rate in Weitzman (2001) (resp. in Reinschmidt, 2002).
It is interesting to notice that while the socially e¢ cient discount rate always converges in
the long run to the lowest individual subjectively anticipated discount rate, the future short
term rates are stochastic and may remain higher than the rational rate and may even converge
in the long run to the highest anticipated risk free rate. Consider for instance the setting with
1 = 2; 1 + 2 = 0 and w1 = w2. It is then easy to obtain that for all t; 1(t) and 2(t) have
the same distribution, which means that none of the agents wins and the short term rate
remains equal on average to the rational rate. What happens now if, for instance, one agent
is pessimistic (or optimistic) with M1 = E () and the other is rational with M2  1. In this
case, the weights i are the same as in the previous setting since they do not depend upon
individual beliefs. However, agent 1 is wrongwhile agent 2 is right and it can be shown
20More precisely, we need that Ei
h
Mi
i
i
= Ei

M i

:
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that21 1(t)!t!1 0 and 2(t)!t!1 1; a.s. Hence, by Equation (3.2), the future risk free rate
converges in the long run to the rational rate. More generally, when agent 1 is more wrong
than agent 2, future short term rates converge to the short term rate that would prevail in the
economy made of agent 2 alone, while the socially e¢ cient discount rate converges to the lowest
anticipated discount rate.
5.2. Power utility functions
We now consider the case of power utility functions. As we have underlined it previously, there
are essentially two di¤erent settings,  < 1 or  > 1; for which the impact of beliefs dispersion
is opposite.
5.2.1. The case  < 1
Let us start by considering the specic case  = 1=2: In this case, we recall that in the standard
setting the yield curve is at and, for all t, Rt = 2   32: We consider two agents, who are
rational on average. Note that Condition (5:1) is equivalent in this setting to the condition that
  2 + infi
 
i + i

> 0.
Proposition 5.2. Consider the case of power utility functions with  = 1=2. Suppose that
1 =  > 0, 2 =  ; w1 = w2, 1 = 2 = 0 and that   2    > 0:
1. The ratio

1
2

is given by
1
2
=
s
  2 + 
  2   
2. The discount rate is a decreasing function of t and is given by
Rt = 2  32   1
t
ln

(1)
2 exp 2t+(2)
2 exp2t+212 exp
  1
2
2t

;
R0 = 2  32 + 2 (1   2)  212;
R1 = 2  32   2:
According to the rst point of the proposition, the relative weight of the optimistic agent is
greater than the relative weight of the pessimistic agent, i.e., 1 > 2 : there is an optimistic
bias at the aggregate level: This result is valid in the general setting with  < 1 (see Appendix
A, Proposition A-4). This implies in particular that an increase in beliefs dispersion leads to
an increase of the short term rate. Notice that in the long term an increase in beliefs dispersion
leads to a decrease of the socially e¢ cient discount rate since it corresponds to a more pessimistic
belief for the more pessimistic agent.
The main result we obtain is the fact that the yield curve is decreasing. We have already
seen that the bias between the discount rate R and an average of the Ris is represented (up to a
constant) by the beliefs dispersion term 14V ar
 (). In the case of logarithmic utility functions;
there is no beliefs dispersion term and, as already seen, the socially e¢ cient discount rate Rt
21See Yan (2008) for related issues.
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decreases with t and converges to the more "pessimistic" individual subjectively anticipated
rate. In the case  = 12 ; we have
2
1

1
2

=

M2t
M1t
1=2  lnN  0; pt : In particular, this
implies that, for large t, "1 is large with respect to 2 or 2 is large with respect to 1" with a
probability near 1. Loosely speaking, there are two kinds of states of the world, those for which
1 vanishes for large t and those for which 2 vanishes for large t: The beliefs dispersion term
1
4V ar
 () = 12
2 vanishes then asymptotically. The socially e¢ cient discount rate curve is
then globally decreasing and converges, as in the logarithmic case, to the most pessimistic rate.
Everything works then as if we had two scenarios one with the optimistic rate and one with
the pessimistic rate and the asymptotic socially e¢ cient discount rate is associated to the worst
scenario as in Gollier (2002a, b) and Weitzman (1998, 2001). This reasoning is valid for general
 < 1. Indeed, we then have 21

1
2

=

M2t
M1t
  lnN  0; 2pt ; and as in the case  = 1=2
the beliefs dispersion term 12(1  )V ar () vanishes asymptotically.
In Figure 3 we represent the socially e¢ cient yield curve as well as the rates associated to
the  average and to the arithmetic average of the individual discount factors22. All these
curves converge asymptotically to the rate associated to the most pessimistic belief but the
"" one is a much better approximation of the yield curve than the "arithmetic" one. The
distance between the yield curve and the "" curve measures the impact of the bias due to
beliefs dispersion. The variance term increases the short rate but its impact decreases with t
and vanishes asymptotically. However this impact can remain non negligible for centuries.
Insert Figure 3
We have assumed so far that both agents are endowed with the same initial endowment.
If we relax this assumption, we still obtain decreasing yield curves converging to the most
pessimistic rate. However, when the more optimistic agent has a larger initial endowment, she
has a greater weight in the average formula and the impact of her optimism lasts longer. The
yield curve has then a higher starting point at t = 0 and its initial slope is smaller. When
the more pessimistic agent has a larger initial endowment, she has a larger weight, the starting
point of the yield curve is lower and the convergence to its asymptotic rate is more rapid.
5.2.2. The case  > 1
As already underlined, the discount rate exhibits both an average belief/time preference e¤ect
that is measured by
P
 i
i and by
P
 i
i and a beliefs dispersion e¤ect that is measured by
the variance term. As in the case  < 1; the average e¤ect induces a decrease of Rt when t
increases (since the associated rate converges asymptotically to the lowest rate) and the variance
term decreases and vanishes asymptotically. However, in the case  > 1; the beliefs dispersion
term 12(1   )V ar () is negative. This leads then to two opposite e¤ects when t increases,
the average e¤ect inducing a decrease of Rt and the dispersion e¤ect inducing an increase of
Rt. Depending on the relative size of these e¤ects, we may obtain decreasing curves as in
the case  < 1 as well as increasing then decreasing curves as in Figure 4. The case  > 1
22 In order to evaluate the integrals and expectations that are involved in the formulas we used the adaptive
quadrature implemented in the R function integrate to approximate the target integral. This function is based
on QUADPACK routines dqags and dqagi (R. Piessens and E. deDoncker-Kapenga,1983) available from Netlib.
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leads then to a richer family of possible shapes and is compatible with the fact that long-term
rates in bonds markets (i.e. t = 30) are usually higher than short-term rates. In the case of
an initially increasing yield curve, this initial shape results from beliefs dispersion and is not
retrieved when we approximate the yield curve by the rates associated to the  average or the
arithmetic average of the individual discount factors as can be seen in Figure 4.
Insert Figure 4
6. Conclusion
When public investment projects entail costs and benets in the very long run, a question arises
about the selection of the relevant discount rate to use for the Costs and Benets Analysis.
Indeed, nancial markets do not provide a guideline in this case. In this paper we provide an
equilibrium analysis of the e¤ect of expectations heterogeneity and pure time preference rates
heterogeneity on the socially e¢ cient discount rate in a (quite general) stochastic setting.
First, we show that the certainty equivalent approach of Weitzman (1998, 2001) that consists
in taking the (unweighted) arithmetic average of the individually recommended discount factors
is compatible with an equilibrium approach if we assume that all utility functions are logarithmic
and that all agents have the same initial endowment and the same time preference rate23.
However, for more general endowment and time preference rate distribution, the average is a
weighted average. Furthermore, for more general utility functions, the right concept of average
to consider within an equilibrium approach is not the arithmetic average but an  average.
Finally, there is a bias induced by beliefs and pure time preference rates dispersion.
Beliefs and time preference rate heterogeneity impact the socially e¢ cient discount factor
as would an additional source of risk. Increased beliefs and/or time preference rates dispersion
leads to lower socially e¢ cient discount rates when  is larger than one.
In the long run, we show that the asymptotic socially e¢ cient discount rate is the lowest
individual subjectively anticipated discount rate which depends on both distribution of patience
and pessimism across agents. This is another element in favor of decreasing discount rates in
the long run.
In the short and in the medium term, beliefs heterogeneity leads to a richer class of possible
shapes for the yield curve. In particular, we may obtain increasing yield curves for the rst 50
years as it is often the case in nancial markets.
Appendix
A Aggregation of individual beliefs and time-preferences
The aim of this Appendix is to extend the results of Jouini and Napp (2007) to our setting with
an innite horizon and heterogeneous time preference rates. We deal with aggregation issues in
the spirit of Varian (1985, 1989), Abel (1989), Calvet et al. (2002), Shefrin (2005).
Proposition A-1 We let N i denote the individual composite characteristic M iDi:
23 In fact, it su¢ ces that the product of the time preference rate and of the initial endowment be the same for
all the agents.
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1. The individual characteristics N i can be aggregated into a consensus characteristic N such
that
qt = Ntu
0 (et )
with
N =
"
NX
i=1
i
 
N it
#1=
:
2. The consensus characteristic N can be written in the form N = BDM where M is a
consensus probability belief, D is a pure time consensus discount factor and B is an ag-
gregation bias, related to beliefs dispersion. More precisely, the martingale process M and
the nite variation processes D and B satisfy dMt = MMtdWt; dDt =  DDtdt; dBt =
 BBtdt with M0 = D0 = B0 = 1 and
M =
NX
i=1
 i
i; D =
NX
i=1
 i
i
B =
1
2
(1  )
"
NX
i=1
 i
 
i
2   2M
#
=
1
2
(1  )V ar ()
Proof
1. Since q is an interior equilibrium price process, we know that there exist Lagrange multipliers
(i) such that for all i and for all t;
1
i
N itu
0

yi

t

= qt : (6.1)
Since
PN
i=1 y
i
t = e

t ; we get
qt = Ntu
0 (et ) with Nt =
"
NX
i=1
i
 
N it
#1=
: (6.2)
2. We can write that dyi

t = ai(t)dt+bi (t) dWt for processes (ai) and (bi) such that
PN
i=1 ai (t) =
te

t and
PN
i=1 bi (t) = te

t : Analogously, we introduce the processes N and N such that
dNt = N (t)Ntdt + N (t)NtdWt. We apply Itôs Lemma to both sides of Equation (6:2).
Identifying the di¤usion parts and the drift parts and after simple computations, we obtain
N = M =
NX
i=1
 i
i
N =
1
2
(   1)
"
NX
i=1
 i
 
i
2   2M
#
 
NX
i=1
 i
i:
It is easy to check then that N is of the form N = BDM:
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Proposition A-2 The risk free rate is given by
rf = D +
1

[+ M]  1
2
1


1 +
1


2 + B (6.3)
with M =
PN
i=1  i
i, D =
PN
i=1  i
i; B =
1
2 (1  )
hPN
i=1  i
 
i
2   2Mi  12 (1  )V ar () :
Proof We adopt the notations of Proposition A-1. We let q (resp. q) denote the drift
(resp. di¤usion) parameter of the process q; i.e. dqt = qqt dt+ qqt dWt: Since q is a state
price density, we obtain as in the standard setting that rf =  q : We know from the proof of
Proposition A-1 that q = Nu0 (e) ; hence we get through Itôs Lemma that
q = u0(e) + N + M

u00 (e)
u0 (e)
e

where u0(e) denotes the drift parameter of the process u
0 (e) : We easily deduce that
rf =
NX
i=1
 i
i +
1

"
+
 
NX
i=1
 i
i
!

#
  1
2
1


1 +
1


2   1
2
(   1)V ar () :
Proposition A-3 If  and  are deterministic and M  0; then  1t logE [Mtu0 (et )] 
 1t logE [u0 (et )]. If we further assume that  > 1 then  1t logE [MtBtu0 (et )]   1t logE [u0 (et )].
Proof The result can be found in Jouini-Napp (2007) for a nite horizon T and homogeneous
time preference rates and is adapted here to the case T =1 and heterogeneous time preference
rates. If Qt is dened on Ft by
dQt
dP =Mt and letting W
Qt
s Ws  
R s
0 M (u) du, we have,
(et )
 1= = exp

 1=
Z t
0

u  
1
2
2u

du+
Z t
0
udW
Qt
u

exp

 1=
Z t
0
uM (u) du

:
If M  0, then exp

 1= R t0 uM (u) du  1, hence,
E
h
Mt (e

t )
 1=
i
 EQt

exp

 1=
Z t
0

u  
1
2
2u

du+
Z t
0
udW
Qt
u

 E

exp

 1=
Z t
0

u  
1
2
2u

du+
Z t
0
udWu

 E
h
(et )
 1=
i
:
It now su¢ ces to remark that Bt  1; a.s. for   1 to conclude.
Proposition A-4 Consider the case of power utility functions. Suppose that 1 =  > 0 and
2 =  ; w1 = w2 and 1 = 2 = 0; then there is an optimistic bias (1 > 2) for  < 1 and a
pessimistic bias (1 < 2) for  > 1:
Proof The result can be found in Jouini-Napp (2007) for a nite horizon T and is adapted here
to the case T =1. Since w1 = w2, the relative weights

1
1

and

1
2

must satisfy
  E
"Z 1
0
(et )
1 1=
 
M1=1
    M2=2
f(M1=1) + (M2=2)g1 1=
dt
#
= 0:
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It is immediate that  can be written in the form  = 11x
 1=g (x) with x2 =

2
1

and
g (x) = E
"Z 1
0
(et )
1 1= x
 
M1t
   1x  M2t 
x
 
M1t

+ 1x
 
M2t
	1 1= dt
#
:
For  < 1, we show that 1  2. We prove 1) that g (1)  0; and 2) that g is increasing with
x, which implies that for 1 > 2 we would have  < 0; which is impossible. We have
g0 (x) = E
"Z 1
0
x
  
M1t

+
 
M2t

=x2
2   x   M1t     M2t  =x22 (1  1=) 
x
 
M1t

+
 
M2t

=x
2 1= (et )1 1= dt
#
,
which is positive for  < 1 and proves 2). Now, g (1) =
R1
0 E

(et )
1 1= (M1) (M2)
f(M1)+(M2)g1 1=

dt:
With deterministic coe¢ cients,
 
M1
 and  M2 can be written in the form  M1 (t) =
Z (t) (e (t))

 and
 
M2

(t) = Z (t) (e (t)) 

 for some deterministic process Z: It is easy to
see that (
M1)
 (M2)
f(M1)+(M2)g1 1= is increasing in e
, hence decreasing in (e)1 1= ; leading to
E
"
(et )
1 1=
 
M1t
    M2t  
M1t

+
 
M2t
	1 1=
#
 E
h
(et )
1 1=
i
E
"  
M1t
    M2t  
M1t

+
 
M2t
	1 1=
#
:
Since E

(M1t )
 (M2t )

f(M1t )+(M2t )g1 1=

= 0; we obtain that g (1)  0.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We let qi

t M itDitu0(et ). By Proposition A-1, we have
qt =
"
NX
i=1
i
 
M itD
i
t
#1=
u0(et ):
This implies that q =
hPN
i=1 i
 
qi

t
i1=
.
1. If i   and if i(s; !)  i(s); we have M i  fM for all i and At;i = DitE hfMtu0(et )i : We
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then have
At = E
24 NX
i=1
i
fMtDitu0(et )
!1=35
=
 
NX
i=1
i
 
Dit
!1=
E
hfMtu0(et )i
=
 
NX
i=1
i

DitE
hfMtu0(et )i
!1=
=
"
NX
i=1
i
 
At;i
#1=
:
2. In the case  = 1, we have At = E
hPN
i=1 iq
i
t
i
=
PN
i=1 iE

qi

t

=
PN
i=1 iA
t;i:
In the case  < 1, we have
(At) =

NX
i=1
i

qi

t

1=

NX
i=1
i
qit 
1=
=
NX
i=1
i
qit 
1
=
NX
i=1
i
 
At;i

hence At 
hPN
i=1 i
 
At;i
i1=
:
In the case  > 1; using Minkovskis Lemma, we get analogously that
E
8<:
"
NX
i=1
i

qi

t
#1=9=;


NX
i=1
iE

qit

;
hence At 
hPN
i=1 i
 
At;i
i1=
:
When N i=N j is deterministic for all (i; j) we get as in 1. that At =
hPN
i=1 i
 
At;i
i1=
:
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Equation (3:3) results from the denition of Rt =  1t logE [qt ] and from Proposition A-
1. For the second equation, we adopt the notations of Appendix A for the drift anf di¤usion
parameters of the process q. We then have
Rt =  1
t
logE
"
exp
Z t
0
 
q  
(q)
2
2
!
ds+
Z t
0
qdWs
#
=  1
t
logE
"
exp
R t
0 qds exp
R t
0 qdWs 
R t
0
(q)
2
2
ds
#
:
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Since q =  rf (see the proof of Proposition A-2), this implies that
Rt =  1
t
logE
"
exp 
R t
0 r
fds exp
R t
0 qdWs 
R t
0
(q)
2
2
ds
#
:
It is easy to obtain by Proposition A-1 and Itôs Lemma that q = M    : Hence Rt =
 1t logEQt
h
exp 
R t
0 r
f
s ds
i
:
Proof of Proposition 4.1
We start by identifying bounds for the socially e¢ cient discount rate in 1. and we prove the
result for the asymptotic socially e¢ cient discount rate in 2.
1. For  = 1; we know by Proposition 3.1 that At =
PN
i=1 iA
t;i, hence
sup
i
 
iA
t;i
  At  sup
i
At;i:
For  < 1; we have seen in Proposition 3.1 that At 
hPN
i=1 i
 
At;i
i1=
: Since
PN
i=1 i = 1;
we get that At  supiAt;i: Moreover, as seen in the proof of Proposition 3.1 we have
At = E
24 NX
i=1
i

qi

t
!1=35 ;
hence for all i we have
At  E

i

qi

t
1=
= E
h
(i)
1= qi

t
i
;
and
At  sup
i

(i)
1= At;i

:
For  > 1; we get analogously that At  supi

(i)
1= At;i

: Moreover, since for all nonneg-
ative real numbers (ai) we have, for  > 1; 
NX
i=1
ai
!1=

NX
i=1
a
1=
i
we then get that, for  > 1;
At = E
24 NX
i=1
i

qi

t
!1=35
 E
"
NX
i=1
(i)
1= qi

t
#
=
NX
i=1
(i)
1= At;i:
2. Consider rst the case  = 1: Since At;i = exp Rt;it; we have supiAt;i = exp  infiR
t;it : Let
us denote by I an agent such that infiR1;i = R1;I ; we have then infiRt;i = Rt;I for t large
enough: Furthermore, it is immediate that supi
 
iA
t;i
  I exp Rt;I t. By 1, we then get, for
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t large enough,
 1
t
log

exp R
t;I t

 Rt   1
t
log

I exp
 Rt;I t

or equivalently
Rt;I  Rt    log (i)
t
+Rt;I
hence limt!1Rt = R1;I = infiR1;i:
Consider the case  < 1: As in the case  = 1 and with the same notations, it is easy to verify
that, for t large enough, supi

(i)
1= At;i

 (I)1= exp Rt;I t and that supiAt;i = exp Rt;I t.
Hence, we have Rt !t!1 R1;I = infiR1;i:
Consider now the case  > 1: We have
NX
i=1
(i)
1= At;i 
 
NX
i=1
(i)
1=
!
sup
i
At;i  N sup
i
At;i:
For t large enough, we then have
Rt;I   1
t
logN  Rt  Rt;I   1=
t
log I
and Rt !t!1 R1;I = infiR1;i:
Proof of Proposition 5.1
1. The relative endowment level wi of agent i must satisfy
wiE
Z 1
0
qt e

tdt

= E
Z 1
0
qt y
i
t dt

= E
Z 1
0
1
i
exp 
itM itdt

=
1
i
Z 1
0
exp 
it dt =
1
ii
;
hence i =
wi
iP
wjj
:
2. The expression for Rt is a direct consequence of the fact that Rt =  1t log
hP2
i=1 i exp
 Rit
i
;
obtained in Proposition 3.1. The expression for R0 is easily obtained by taking the limit when t
converges to 0 in the expression of Rt: The expression for R1 results from Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
1. Since w1 = w2; the relative weights i must solve
E
Z 1
0
(et )
 1
h
1
 
M1t
1=2   2  M2t 1=2i h1  M1t 1=2 + 2  M2t 1=2i dt = 0:
This is equivalent toZ 1
0
exp( +
2=2 2=2)tE
h
(1)
2 exp( )Wt   (2)2 exp(  )Wt
i
dt = 0
or Z 1
0
exp( +
2=2 2=2)t

(1)
2 exp
( )2
2
t  (2)2 exp
(+)2
2
t

dt = 0:
This implies that
(1)
2
(2)
2 =
  + 2   
( + 2 + ) :
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2. We know that Rt =  1t log
nP2
i=1 i
 
M it
o1=
(et )
 1=

: It is then easy to obtain that
Rt =    
2
2 +
2
2   1t lnE
h 
1 exp
( )Wt +2 exp(  )Wt
1=i
: For  = 1=2; we have Rt =
2  2 + 22   1t lnVt with
Vt = E
h
(1)
2 exp2(=2 )Wt +(2)
2 exp 2(=2+)Wt+212 exp
 2Wt
i
:
We have then
Vt = (1)
2 exp2(=2 )
2t+(2)
2 exp2(=2+)
2t+212 exp
22t
= exp2
2t

(1)
2 exp(
2=2 2)t+(2)
2 exp(
2=2+2)t+212

;
hence
Rt = 2  32   1
t
ln

(1)
2 exp 2t+(2)
2 exp2t+212 exp
  1
2
2t

:
The result on R1 comes from Proposition 4.1. The result on R0 comes from taking the limit
when t converges to 0 in the expression of Rt.
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Figure 6.1: This gure represents Rt as a function of t in the case of logarithmic utility functions,
same time-preference rates
 
1 = 2

, same relative initial endowment levels (w1 = w2), and for
three di¤erent levels of beliefs dispersion j ; j = 1; 2; 3 (agent 1 has a belief j and agent 2
has a belief  j). The straight line represents the rational rate. We take  = 1:8%;  = 3:6%
and  near 0: We take 1 = 0:07; 2 = 0:14; 3 = 0:21: The three curves are decreasing (see
Proposition 5.1). For all t; the discount rate Rt decreases with the level of beliefs dispersion
(see Table 1), hence the three curves do not cross and the lowest curve corresponds to the
highest level of beliefs dispersion. The three curves start from the rational rate. Each curve Cj
converges asymptotically to the pessimistic discount rate +   2   j :
28
10007505002500
0.02
0.0175
0.015
0.0125
t
R
Figure 6.2: This gure represents Rt as a function of t for three di¤erent levels of beliefs
dispersion j ; j = 1; 2; 3 in the case of logarithmic utility functions, equal time-preference rates 
1 = 2

and a positive correlation between wealth and optimism. The straight line represents
the rational rate. We take  = 1:8%;  = 3:6% and  near 0; 1 = 0:07; 2 = 0:14; 3 = 0:21
(agent 1 has a belief j and agent 2 has a belief  j); w1 = 0:8; w2 = 0:2 : The three curves
are decreasing (Proposition 5.1), each curve Cj converging asymptotically to the pessimistic
discount rate + 2 j : Since w1 > w2; for small t the discount rate Rt increases with the
level of beliefs dispersion (Proposition 5.1), and for larger t; it decreases with the level of beliefs
dispersion, hence the three curves cross. Since w1 6= w2; the three curves start from di¤erent
points, which are given by +  2+(w1   w2)j : The lowest curve at t = 1000 correspond
to the highest level of beliefs dispersion.
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Figure 6.3: This gure represents the socially e¢ cient discount rate for 1 = 2;  = 0:4;  = 0;
 = 0:018;  = 0:036; and  = 0:35 as well as the curves associated to the  average (resp.
arithmetic average) of the individual discount factors. The discount rate curve dominates the
 average that dominates the arithmetic average. With these parameters values, the rational
rate is equal to 3.2%.
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Figure 6.4: This gure represents the socially e¢ cient discount rate for 1 = 0:6;  = 1:2;
 = 0:04;  = 0:036;  = 0:7 as well as the curves associated to the  average (resp. arithmetic
average) of the individual discount factors. The arithmetic average dominates the  average
that dominates the discount rate curve.
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